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Hirschman’s model of ‘exit’ envisages that mass migration can communicate 
feedback to a state and elicit modifying policy behaviour. The regimes of 
discrimination against Russophones in Estonia and Latvia are examined to 
demonstrate that in certain conditions of inter-ethnic conflict the model does not work 
as predicted. In deeply divided societies the mass migration of a minority can be 
intentionally promoted by a majority regime of discrimination and thus does not 
perform a feedback function. Equally, in such conditions migration may operate as a 
safety valve to release the build up of minority antagonisms against the 
discriminatory regimes. The cases of Estonia and Latvia also illustrate the limitations 
of international conditionality from the EU and OSCE to prevent anti-minority 
policies, when there is a lack of international commitment and when governing elites 
resist. Given the lack of political will in Estonia and Latvia to modify the regimes of 
discrimination, and the poor prospects for integration or assimilation, the article 
predicts a significant out-migration by Russophones to other EU member states when 




Studies of the relations between the titular nationalities and the Russophones in 
Estonia and Latvia are generally analysed under the model of ‘ethnic democracy’ 
(Smith, 1996; Smith et al 1998; Järve, 2000; Smooha, 2001). In both states 
nationalizing projects were formulated around regimes of discrimination intended to 
subordinate the large Russophone minorities to titular hegemony.
1 Equally, the 
‘rationality’ of the nationalizing regimes is often stressed. The institutionalization of 
exclusivist citizenship and language policies, it is argued, has allowed the 
reproduction of titular ethnic hegemony through a near-monopoly of career 
opportunities in government, public administration, the professions, and the economy 
(Steen, 1996). Some studies have focussed on the ‘internal’ aspects of the issue and 
how it may be managed by policies of assimilation or integration (Laitin, 1998; 
Kolstø, 1999 and 2002).
2 Some have emphasised the role of international pressure on 
both states to moderate their nationalizing regimes by securing citizenship and other 
rights and protections internally for the Russophones (Gelazis, 2004). Others are 
critical of the effectiveness of the EU and the Organisation for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) in this area (Hughes and Sasse, 2003; Sasse, 2005). Comparative experience suggests that the only practical alternatives to integration and 
assimilation under such regimes are violence, or ‘exit’ in the sense of out-migration.
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The ‘exit’ option of out-migration has been given a new impetus by the accession of 
Estonia and Latvia to membership of the EU and by recent policy changes in the EU 
in the field of rights for citizens, residents and third country nationals (TCNs). The 
Russophones of Estonia and Latvia are one of the largest minority groups in the EU, 
and many hundreds of thousands of its members are stateless (Table 1 and Table 2a 
and 2b). In the period immediately preceding enlargement just over 523,00 (22.4%) of 
the 2.34 million population of Latvia were stateless (European Commission, Regular 
Report on Latvia, 2002: 30). In Estonia, the figure was 172,000 (12.5%) of a 
population of 1.37 million (European Commission, Regular Report on Estonia, 2002: 
30). Such high levels of statelessness are extraordinary within the EU. This article 
analyses the regimes of discrimination in Estonia and Latvia in two key respects. 
Firstly, it examines the attempts by international organizations, specifically the EU 
and OSCE, to apply conditionality to moderate the nationalizing projects and to 
protect the minority Russophone community. Secondly, it assesses the potential for 
‘exit’ by out-migration of Russophones as a means of escaping the regimes of 
discrimination and the condition of statelessness. 
 
 
Reconceptualizing ‘Exit’ in Ethnically Divided States 
 
Comparative experience of regimes of discrimination against minorities suggests that 
they cannot easily be sustained in democratic states in the absence of systematic 
coercion or forms of  ‘control’ (Lustick, 1979). Minorities will ultimately seek to 
change their conditions under a regime of discrimination through three main routes, 
roughly approximating to the model developed in Hirschman’s ‘Exit, Voice and 
Loyalty’ (Hirschman, 1970). Let us take the potential responses in reverse order. 
Firstly, a persecuted minority may seek to escape discrimination through processes of 
compliant assimilation (loyalty). Secondly, assuming the political regime is tolerant, 
the minority may seek change by peaceful political and economic mobilization. When 
this option is suppressed, a persecuted minority may resort to violence. Both recourses 
are forms of ‘voice’.
4 Thirdly, a minority may seek to improve its conditions by 
exercising the ‘exit’ option. This may take two forms: alienation and withdrawal from 
politics, and out-migration from the country where they suffer from a regime of 
discrimination. Our concern here is with the potential for the latter form of voluntary 
‘exit’ in Estonia and Latvia. 
 
Hirschman’s model was devised to explain behaviour within a competitive 
environment, primarily of firms. He understood ‘exit’ to be a corrective ‘mechanism 
of recuperation from performance lapses’, where the ‘exit’ of consumers incurred 
costs to the firm/organization and communicated these in a form which allowed 
remedial action to be taken (Hirschman, 1970: 24-5). Hirschman extended the model 
to explain the impact of ‘exit’ (in the form of out-migration) on the political stability 
of a state, using the collapse of the German Democratic Republic in 1988-9 as a case 
where private ‘exit’ and public ‘voice’ ‘worked hand in glove’ (Hirschman, 1993: 
202). In the cases of Estonia and Latvia, ‘exit’ tends to be explored from the 
perspective of the titular elites. In the mid-1990s, Hirschman’s model was employed 
to explore ‘exit’ potential in the sense of out-migration of the Russophones to Russia 
  1(not a very attractive prospect given its then state of political disorder and economic 
collapse) (Laitin, 1998: 158-98). This reflected the prominent discourse among the 
titular nationalist political classes for ‘repatriation’.  
 
When applying the concept of  ‘exit’ to majority-minority relations in deeply divided 
societies, where politics is significantly shaped by an ethno-political or other deep 
social cleavage, some modification is necessary. In such cases ‘exit’ loses its remedial 
feedback or corrective function for state behaviour. The ‘exit’ of the minority by out-
migration may be the preference for the organization, in this case the state, as much as 
for the consumer, in this case the ethnic minority. It is perverse to think of ‘exit’ as 
performing a remedial function on state behaviour in such cases since it will almost 
certainly be of a permanent nature. In other words, in political contexts where 
majority-minority relations are a significant political issue, ‘exit’ means finality and 
closure on the issue not feedback. An ethnic minority that out-migrates because of 
opposition to a discriminatory ethnic hegemony, from a state where they have weak 
historical roots, and where they are not wanted by the majority, are not likely to return 
if they can find better prospects elsewhere, even if discrimination stops. 
 
The classic hypotheses on migration are based on utility theory and offer various 
‘push-pull’ models. The more complex models stress a combination of factors related 
to the socio-economic conditions of individuals and their expectations (Krieger, 2004: 
88ff). A strong economy, where benefits are distributed across all sections of society, 
even if unequally, can be expected to make a regime of discrimination more bearable 
than an economy in decline, where the discriminated minority is likely to suffer 
disproportionately.  The scale of any out-migration also depends on the proximity and 
openness of other countries. In the case of Estonia and Latvia, Laitin’s ‘tipping 
model’ of migration rests on a simple utility calculus determined by three factors: 
expected economic returns, in-group status, and out-group status. His conclusion is 
that Russophones are likely to opt for ‘cumulative assimilation’ within both states, 
whereby the Russophones will be transformed into ‘Balts’ (sic!) (Laitin, 1998: 28-30). 
This model assumes that the political regimes for the management of inter-ethnic 
relations in Estonia and Latvia are designed to promote integration or assimilation, 
and thus reflect a commitment by the majority and minority to cooperate on this 
strategy. How valid is this assumption? 
 
 
Regimes of Discrimination 
 
While in Latvia about 42% of Russophones have been officially recognised as 
‘original’ (aka ‘indigenous’), many Russophones migrated to Estonia and Latvia in 
the decade after 1945 (Table 3 and Table 4) (Tsilevich and Poleshchuk, 2004). These 
migrants have been resident as long as the Gastarbeiter Turks in Germany, and 
somewhat longer than the Black and Asian populations of the UK, or the North 
Africans in France. In contrast to the Gastarbeiter, the Russophone migration was not 
envisaged as a temporary phenomenon but rather was planned to give permanence to 
the Sovietization of Estonia and Latvia. Many Russophones were motivated to 
migrate by the higher than average socio-economic conditions in Estonia and Latvia, 
and the cultural incentives derived from their perceived ‘Europeanness’. Significant 
numbers of Russophones also originated as retirees from the Soviet military garrisons. 
By the late 1980s when the USSR was disintegrating, the Russophone minority 
  2constituted a much larger percentage of the population in Estonia and Latvia than any 
comparable migrant group in any European country (Table 4).
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The regimes of discrimination have been hinged on three policy pillars. The first pillar 
is the denial of citizenship. The second pillar is cultural subordination through the 
control of the use of the Russian language in the public and private domains, in 
particular in public administration, the mass media, and education. The third pillar is 
the restriction of Russophone participation in political and economic life by limiting 
many key spheres and professions to citizens. The regimes of discrimination are 
administered by state agencies, for example the Estonian Citizenship and Migration 
Board and the Latvian Naturalization Board. The policy and legal foundations of the 
three pillars have been comprehensively analysed in other work (Antane and 
Tsilevich, 1999; Kemp, 2001; Sarv, 2002; Dorodnova, 2002). My focus here is to 
explain why the regimes of discrimination persisted in an international climate that, in 
theory, promoted minority protection. 
 
The post-independence policies of ethnic discrimination in both states appeared to be 
designed to promote the ‘voluntary’ repatriation of minorities – a goal of the 
nationalist elites that came to power after 1991. This sentiment was constrained only 
by high growth rates, economic dependence on Russophone labour, and international 
criticism. Many tens of thousands of Russophones were denied citizenship outright, 
and the bulk of the minorities in both states were compelled to overcome complex 
legal, bureaucratic, and linguistic hurdles to obtain citizenship. Citizenship is critical 
for the enjoyment of many of the fundamental rights and freedoms in any democracy, 
but even more so in newly democratizing states. Non-citizens cannot form political 
parties, run for political office or vote in national elections, vote in local elections 
(Latvia), and rights to free movement, employment and ownership are limited. There 
right to use their own language in private and public, in education, business and the 
mass media is controlled by law. There is much anecdotal evidence of discriminatory 
employment practices, though official data on this is not collated. The regime of 
discrimination is most developed by law in the case of Latvia where there are more 
than 33 separate categories of employment barred for non-citizens, and numerous 
restrictions on their rights (see Annex 1). Some categories of Russophones were 
forced to out-migrate. For example military personnel and their families, former KGB 
employees, and those classified as politically undesirable, were compelled to leave 
Estonia and Latvia in the first half of the 1990s. Poor data meant that previous studies 
underestimated the scale of out-migration at around 150,000 in the period 1991-6 
(about 60,000 from Estonia, and over 90,000 from Latvia), with a peak in 1992-4 
(Smith, 1998: 106-7, figure 5.1). Recent official data for Latvia only for the period 
1991-5 indicates that the figure was significantly higher at over 168,000 (Central 
Statistical Bureau, Latvia, 2005). The vast majority of Russophones have remained in 
situ, but citizenship laws have been employed to fragment them into three main sub-
groups: i. citizens, ii. permanent residents, and iii. temporary residents. The latter two 
categories, de facto, are an imposed condition of statelessness if persons have not 
been granted the citizenship of a third country, such as Russia. One of the resulting 
ironies of the regime of discrimination was that in the elections to the European 
Parliament in June 2004 hundreds of thousands of Russophone residents were 
disenfranchised, while foreigners who were EU citizens were allowed to vote.
6  
 
  3While the plight of the Russophones has been given an increasing priority in Russian 
foreign policy under Putin, in contrast, the EU, the US and the overwhelming majority 
of OSCE states stress democratic content over discriminatory practice in the cases of 
Estonia and Latvia. The regimes of discrimination in Estonia and Latvia were 
modified in some respects by international pressure in the second half of the 1990s 
(discussed later) emanating from OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities, 
Max Van der Stoel, and EU accession conditionality. In particular, both states were 
pressured to provide for speedier and easier processes of naturalization for non-
citizens. While the modifications had a significant impact on policy in Estonia, the 
situation in Latvia was barely affected.  
 
Two main explanatory theses, which I term the continuity thesis and the conditionality 
thesis, are generally employed in studies of the nationalizing policies in the Baltic 
states. The first focuses on the restorative character of the post-Soviet states of 
Estonia and Latvia. The resistance of Estonia and Latvia to the granting of citizenship 
and other policies to promote the integration and assimilation of the Russophone 
minority is thereby explained by their lack of obligation under international law. The 
second approach stresses the credibility of EU accession conditionality in forcing 
Estonia and Latvia to soften their policies to a level of discrimination that was 
acceptable to the EU, OSCE and its HCNM. The closure of the OSCE Missions in 
both states in December 2001, their entry into NATO in April 2004, and accession to 
the EU in May 2004 were signals from the West to Estonia and Latvia that their 
respective policies on citizenship and other rights for Russophones had passed an 
international litmus test. There are significant flaws in both the continuity and 
conditionality theses as to some extent these approaches per se have diverted attention 
from the harsh realities of the discriminatory regimes and have distorted the 
evaluation of the prospects for mass migration.  
 
 
State Continuity and Normative Discontinuity 
 
The impulses of governing elites in nationalizing states have been well characterised 
by the nineteenth century Italian nationalist Massimo D’Azeglio’s observation that 
‘we have made Italy, and now we have to make Italians’. In the case of Estonia and 
Latvia after the fall of the USSR in late 1991, D’Azeglio’s motif had to be subverted 
in the sense that both states had inherited a common civic ‘Soviet’ citizenship. The 
demographic shifts and trends in the twentieth century, and the post-Soviet citizenship 
policies and legal changes of both states have been extensively analysed elsewhere, 
and thus I will simply summarise the key developments and data here (for further 
analysis see Nørgaard, 1996; Kolstø, 1999 and 2002). As noted earlier, migration 
trends in the Soviet Union post-1945 had radically altered the ethnic balances in the 
populations of both states. For the titular nationalist elites it was imperative to redress 
this inherited citizenship structure both to avoid power-sharing with the Russophone 
minority and in order to pursue an undiluted nationalizing state project. In Lithuania, 
where the titular nationality was an overwhelming majority, a so-called ‘zero-option’ 
of a civic and inclusive citizenship for all Soviet citizens resident in the state was 
implemented. In contrast, in Estonia and Latvia where the ethnic balance was much 
closer, and consequently the perception of threat for nationalists was much greater, 
citizenship was reconstructed along ethno-national lines. To reconfigure the 
citizenship required that the Soviet Estonian and Soviet Latvian civic citizenships be 
  4‘unmade’. The debate within the Estonian and Latvian nationalist movements in 
1989-91 coalesced around a consensus that the expulsion of the ‘occupant’ and ‘alien’ 
population was politically impossible and thus citizenship became the key instrument 
for the process of remaking the state in an exclusivist and quasi-segregationist ethnic 
mould. Estonia and Latvia justified their projects for an ethnic definition of the new 
states by employing the principle of ‘state continuity’ (Gelazis, 2004). While some 
neighbouring Western states, such as Finland and Sweden, had recognised Soviet 
annexation of the Baltic republics, and many (including Britain and France) had 
operated a de facto recognition, the US consistently opposed recognition under its 
Stimpson doctrine. It was not until the Soviet collapse in late August 1991 that the 
USA and EC jointly moved quickly to include the Baltic states in international 
organisations such as the OSCE, Council of Europe and UN on the grounds that their 
sovereignty had been interrupted by Soviet annexation and was now being restored. 
 
The state continuity principle gave the Estonian and Latvian titular nationalist elites 
the opportunity to establish an ethnic hegemony under the cover of restoring the 
constitutional and legal frameworks of the pre-Soviet era. Estonia promulgated a new 
constitution in 1992, which re-established the pre-Soviet republic and restored its 
1938 law on citizenship (as amended in 1940), thus restricting citizenship to those 
citizens, and their descendants, of the pre-1940 period. In Latvia, however, the 1922 
constitution and 1919 citizenship law (as amended in 1927), were reinstated on a 
piece-by-piece approach. The first articles of the constitution (1-3 and 6) were re-
established by the Independence Declaration adopted on May 4, 1990, while the 
Constitution (Satversme) in full was formally reinstated only by the 6th Saeima 
elected in June 1993. Meanwhile, in October 1991 the Supreme Council adopted the 
Resolution on the Renewal of the Body of Citizens of the Republic of Latvia and the 
Main Principles of Naturalization, which established a legal basis for the registration 
of citizens on the basis of a ‘restored citizenship’, which effectively limited 
citizenship to those who had been citizens of  pre-1940 Latvia and their descendants. 
The so-called ‘Citizenship law’, which permitted naturalization, was adopted only in 
July 1994 and entered into force in February 1995. Thus, a person born in say Toronto 
to a Latvian or Estonian parent who had the right to citizenship under the pre-1940 
criteria could claim citizenship, whereas a person born in Tallinn or Riga who did not 
meet the pre-1940 criteria, could not claim citizenship. The continuity principle thus 
provided a legal device for an administrative ethnic cleansing of the citizen body, 
purging it of Russophones (mainly Russians), and consolidating titular ethnic political 
and economic hegemony.  
 
These policies must be understood as a reaction to a half century of Soviet 
occupation, and embittered memories of bloody persecutions and deportations in the 
decade after World War Two.  To understand is not to excuse, however, and it is 
morally objectionable to blame the whole Russophone minority for Soviet policies, or 
to resist their integration as equal citizens because of a strategy of ethnic privileging. 
By far the worst Soviet repression in the Baltic states occurred in Lithuania, which did 
not post-1991 install a regime of discrimination. The continuity claim, however, is 
employed by the titular elites in Estonia and Latvia in a way which decontextualises 
the principle of restoration from the historical conditions in which their state 
sovereignty was established. The protection of the rights of minorities, admittedly 
then much smaller in number, was an intrinsic feature of the creation of the states of 
Estonia and Latvia in 1919-20, as it was in many of the other states of Central and 
  5Eastern Europe that emerged after the Versailles settlement of 1919. Both states, as 
part of the treaties with Russia, and as a condition of membership of the League of 
Nations, were required to create an inclusive citizenship from the outset, to entrench 
minority protections in their constitutions, to guarantee minority political 
representation through electoral laws, and to promote minority cultural self 
government, especially in education and the use of language in public administration 
(Von Rauch, 1974, 135-45; Hope, 1996, 48-52).
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In applying the principle of state legal continuity to the post-1991 era, we should also 
consider the normative dimensions of this principle, and the extent to which a 
normative continuity with regard to citizenship and minority protection should have 
been required. Naturally, the nationalizing elites of Estonia and Latvia have 
downplayed the normative aspects of state continuity, and though cultural rights for 
citizens belonging to minority groups have been retained from the 1919-20 era, there 
is no political will and bureaucratic obstacles have been set against their 
implementation. For example, Estonia’s law of October 1993 on ‘Cultural Autonomy 
for National Minorities’ was limited to Estonian citizens, thus excluding the vast 
majority of the Russophone community. Estonia and Latvia have promoted state 
continuity through constitutional and legal frameworks which have been eviscerated 
of their normative content with regard to inclusive citizenship and the protection of 
minorities. The acceptance of ‘restoration’ by the Western democracies has allowed 
Estonia and Latvia to treat their minorities within a framework of ‘decolonization’, 




International Conditionality: Realism and Realities 
 
It is ironic that the nationalizing projects of Estonia and Latvia occurred in a context 
of a resurgence of an international agenda for minority protection in Europe in the late 
1980s and early 1990s. Post-communist conflicts accelerated the securitization of the 
issue of minority protection, which in turn bolstered the role of the OSCE and its 
newly established HCNM in managing the issue. The ‘norm’ of minority protection 
was rhetorically prominent in how external and internal actors evaluated state-
building and democracy in the CEE states after the fall of communism, and it became 
one of the core norms of the EU in its road map for EU enlargement to the east. The 
basic conditions for new members established by the declaration of the June 1993 
Copenhagen Council (the ‘Copenhagen criteria’) borrowed from the existing OSCE 
norms on the need for democratic states to guarantee human rights and protect the 
rights of minorities. The Copenhagen criteria of 1993 also dropped the conventional 
‘persons’ formulation of international agreements in preference for a ‘group’ rights 
approach for minority protection in confirmation of EU support for the policy 
paradigm developed by the Paris Charter (1990) and the Badinter Commission (1991-
2) for dealing with the post-communist states (Sasse, 2005). The problem for 
implementing such norms was/is that there is no agreed legal, or indeed conceptual, 
definition of what constitutes a national ‘minority’. The ambiguities were replicated in 
the key OSCE General Recommendations issued throughout the 1990s and the 
Council of Europe’s (COE) Framework Convention for the Protection of National 
Minorities (1995) (FCNM).
8 Prior experience had demonstrated that the power of the 
  6OSCE and COE to ensure compliance was relatively weak. For example, no state has 





The effectiveness of EU accession conditionality is a contested issue. For some, the 
‘Copenhagen criteria’ have been a credible and successful mechanism for the 
promotion of democracy, human rights and the protection of minorities (Smith, 2001; 
Grabbe, 2001).
9  In the case of minority protection in Estonia and Latvia, it is argued 
that EU conditionality, relying on the recommendations of the OSCE HCNM, had a 
tremendous amount of leverage (Gelazis, 2004). Other studies have questioned the 
effectiveness of EU conditionality, arguing that it was often overridden by political 
realism, and was not closely temporally correlated with the policies and laws on 
minority issues in Estonia and Latvia. Furthermore, the EU’s key instrument for 
measuring compliance with its accession conditionality - the annual ‘progress’ 
country report – demonstrated that the political concepts and standards prescribed by 
the Copenhagen criteria were not easily benchmarked or readily translatable into 
recommendations for ‘implementation’. A law can exist formally but may not be 
implemented in part or in whole because of deliberate non-compliance, or because of 
‘capacity’ weakness in candidate states (Hughes and Sasse, 2003; Hughes, Sasse & 
Gordon, 2004; Sasse, 2005). During the enlargement process the condition of two 
minority groups in Central and Eastern Europe were identified as a concern by the EU 
- the Russophone minority in Estonia and Latvia, and the Roma.  
 
Sasse has detailed the clear inconsistency over time in the EU reports for both states 
as regards policies towards the Russophones (Sasse, 2005). The reports recorded a 
checklist of formal measures of compliance (such as legislation on citizenship, 
naturalization procedures, language rights, and electoral laws; the establishment of 
ombudsmen; and government ‘strategies’ on integration). They did not assess the 
effectiveness of implementation. Trends were evaluated by numerical benchmarks, 
such as the number of a minority granted citizenship, number of requests for 
naturalization, the pass rate for language or citizenship tests, the number of school or 
classes taught in the state and minority languages, the number of teachers trained to 
teach in the state and minority languages, the extent of media and broadcasting in 
minority languages, and so on. The Reports employed ambiguous references to 
‘international standards’ or ‘European standards’, in particular in connection with the 
adoption of laws or their implementation. EU officials often cited the FCNM as a 
benchmark, but this was not a condition for accession (EU Monitoring Accession 
Program, 2002: 18). Indeed, Latvia, only ratified the FCNM in April 2005, one year 
after its accession to the EU. When the reports do identify problems in the field of 
minority protection policy these are attributed to under-funding, weak administrative 
capacity, understaffing and the low levels of public awareness in the CEE states, 
rather than ideological opposition to the very concept itself, which was clearly the 
case in Estonia and Latvia. 
 
Robust measures of how committed a government is to the integration of minorities 
are the rate of naturalization, and the use of public funds to promote the policy 
broadly. The EU toned and deflected criticisms in these critical areas. In the case of 
Estonia, the EU’s report for 2002 blamed low rates of naturalization (about 2% or 
  73,000-4,000 persons per annum) on ‘relatively limited motivation’ of non-citizens, 
without explaining why this might be the case (European Commission, Report on 
Estonia, 2002: 30). In the case of Latvia, the EU’s report for 2002 merely reported the 
slow decrease in the proportion of non-citizens from 24.6% to 22.4%. If one takes 
funding as a strong benchmark of commitment levels, then we should note that the 
Latvian government allocated just €760,714 for the National Programme for Latvian 
Language Training in 2002. Given that Latvian language proficiency is a pre-requisite 
for citizenship, the low funding for it is a demonstration of low commitment by the 
state (European Commission, Report on Latvia, 2002: 30-34). Similarly, in March 
1999 the Estonian government adopted a policy document ‘Integration of non-
Estonians into Estonian Society: Government Action Plan’ which mandated the 
recently established ‘Integration Foundation’ with the task of elaborating a state 
integration programme for the period 2000-2007. In 1999 the state budget allocated 
just €370,000 to activities connected with integration and language training. The 2002 
Reports on Estonia and Latvia contain the most absurd contradictions. The closure of 
the OSCE missions in late 2001 (discussed below) is reported as proof of the full 
compliance of both states with EU norms. At the same time, Latvia was criticized for 
its failure to ratify the FCNM, for its restrictive naturalization, and for limiting the 
political participation of minorities through language laws (European Commission, 
Report on Latvia, 2002: 30-35). 
 
The EU Regular ‘Progress’ Reports reflected a kind of cat-and-mouse battle between 
the Estonian and Latvian governments, on the one hand, who were determined to 
minimise concessions on their nationalizing projects, and the Commission, on the 
other hand, which wanted the modifications set out by the OSCE Missions and 
HCNM. Non-compliance and the dragging of feet approach by Estonia and Latvia, 
however, were not permitted to block the entry of the two states to the EU. Much of 
the pressure on the EU and OSCE in this respect, as we shall discuss below, came 
from the USA, whose main concern was the expansion of NATO to the Baltic states. 
The result was an equivocal pursuit by the EU of moderation in Estonia and Latvia, 






The logic underlying the establishment of the HCNM was anticipatory. Future 
conflicts could be avoided, according to the logic, by learning lessons from past 
conflicts, and by deploying resources proactively in a timely manner to defuse 
problems. The effectiveness of international conditionality is best measured by the 
compliance of the subject. Those who advocate that conditionality was effective in the 
cases of Estonia and Latvia point to the modifications made to laws on citizenship and 
education, and to other policy compromises secured primarily by pressure from the 
HCNM and the ‘quiet diplomacy’ of High Commissioner (1992-2001), Dutch 
diplomat Max van der Stoel. Much of the literature on the subject of the HCNM’s 
effectiveness is informed by the writings of those who worked in the HCNM itself. 
They provided excellent narratives of how HCNM recommendations informed 
changes to laws on citizenship, education, the creation of Ombudsmen, and national 
programmes of integration in both Estonia and Latvia. These works have popularised 
the view in the academic and policy communities that the HCNM was exceptionally 
  8successful even while the OSCE Missions were still operating in both countries 
(Zaagman, 1999; Kemp, 2001, van der Stoel, 2001a). Indeed, van der Stoel has 
chasitized his critics as ‘extremists’ (van der Stoel, 2001b).  
 
Among other duties related to conflict prevention, van der Stoel saw himself as an 
‘advocate of minorities’ (van der Stoel, 2001a: 123). The fundamental problem that he 
faced in Estonia and Latvia was the contradictory international position whereby the 
legal continuity of the Baltic states was recognised (thus making de-citizenship 
possible), while the treatment of the Russophones was seen as a cause for concern and 
conflict potential. It is difficult to reconcile the claims of successful international 
intervention with an outcome which has left some 700,000 persons stateless and 
without fundamental political and economic rights. In Estonia, where laws and 
procedures for naturalization are by far much easier than in Latvia, at current rates the 
process will take two generations (sixty years) to be complete. Other studies are more 
circumspect about the effectiveness of the OSCE and HCNM. A recent study of 
Latvia suggests that the severe imbalance in the ethnic structure of power established 
by ‘ethnic democracy’ predated the HCNM’s involvement, and was impossible to roll 
back. Consequently, the HCNM role was limited to seeking modifications to 
discriminatory laws and policies, rather than addressing the fundamentally 
discriminatory character of the regime per se (Dorodnova, 2003: 135). A study of 
Estonia characterised the HCNM role as ‘firefighting’. Rather than seeking to 
challenge and to alter the structure of discrimination institutionalised in the state, the 
HCNM concentrated on the short-term goals of modifying those laws and policies 
which were most likely to provoke immediate conflict, such as the law on aliens of 
1993 (Sarv, 2002: 105-7). 
 
The activities of the HCNM was a largely non-transparent ‘confidential’ diplomatic 
process of ‘behind-the-scenes’ prodding and cajoling of Estonian and Latvian 
governments during numerous visits, and exchanges of letters. For reasons of 
international politics discussed below, the work of the HCNM was more circumspect 
in Latvia and Estonia, than in any other case, and thus laid his work open to charges 
of ‘double standards’ from the Russian Federation. The public pronouncements of van 
der Stoel stressed other cases of minority persecution, such as the ‘plight of the 
Roma’ and their experience of ‘discrimination and exclusion’, and the ethnic 
problems of the Balkans, but he never specifically publicly focussed on Latvia and 
Estonia.
10 In contrast, a much more public effort to moderate the nationalizing 
policies came from the in-country activities of the ‘long-term’ Missions established in 
both states by the OSCE in October 1993 with a mandate to ‘promote stability, 
dialogue and understanding between the communities’, and which operated separately 
from the HCNM. Only some of the relevant documents have subsequently been 
published by the OSCE.
11 It was also understandable that the Russian Federation 
should complain about double standards from the OSCE and EU when these 
institutions devoted so much time and effort to securing institutional arrangements for 
decentralization and autonomy for minority groups in the Former Yugoslavia (in 
Bosnia, Kosovo, and  Macedonia) in the latter 1990s. 
 
How successful were the HCNM and the country Missions, supported by leverage 
from the EU accession process, in securing modifications to the regimes of 
discrimination in Latvia and Estonia? In Estonia, for example, following the HCNM 
recommendations, measures were introduced to amend the law on aliens of 1993 and 
  9to simplify naturalization procedures in 1997 and 1998, and 2001, especially for 
stateless children who were now granted Estonian citizenship, if born in Estonia after 
26 February 1992 and upon their parents’ request (by 2003 some 3,000 children 
achieved citizenship by this means) (Senipalu, 2003: 16). The tests for citizenship 
(both language and civic knowledge) were simplified, and a large-scale process of 
converting temporary resident permits into permanent resident permits was launched. 
Citizens and residents were excluded from immigration quotas (a barrier to family 
reunification, in particular for Russophones). A government ‘Action Plan’ for 
integration was introduced in March 1999, though the small budget suggested that it 
was not a policy priority. An important concession introduced in June 1999 in Estonia 
was an amendment to the Law on Local Council Elections, which allowed non-
citizens legally resident in Estonia to vote in the local elections for the first time. This 
was a significant political concession given the territorial concentration of large 
numbers of Russophone non-citizens in Tallinn and Narva.  No such concessions on 
electoral rights for non-citizens were forthcoming from Latvia, despite equivalent 
pressure. The concessions in Estonia were also accompanied by a further tightening of 
restrictions on non-citizens in other areas. For example, in August 1999, Estonia 
introduced a minimum income requirement for persons applying for Estonian 
residence permits, persons who wished to exchange a temporary residence permit for 
a permanent residence permit, and for family reunification. This was a new and 
significant obstacle for illegal residents to regularize their situation. 
 
Having previously focussed on the issue of citizenship, in the late 1990s the 
nationalizing projects in both states turned to cultural issues, and in particular 
language use and education. In May 1999 amendments to the Parliamentary and Local 
Elections Law required candidates for parliamentary and local elections to have a 
‘sufficient’ level of Estonian, thus excluding the vast majority of Russophones.   
Modifications were made under sustained OSCE and EU pressure to the Estonian 
language law of 1995 (as amended in 1999 and 2000), which created a ‘justified 
public interest’ to make Estonian compulsory and privileged its use in many public 
sectors and even private activities. In Estonia, it is legally possible only for 
municipalities where Russophones account for more than 50% of the local population 
to make a request to use Russian as a language of public administrative in parallel to 
Estonian. This compares very unfavourably with the standard 20% population 
threshold for minority language use in public administration inherited from the 
Austro-Hungarian empire, affirmed by the League of Nations in Central and Eastern 
Europe in the 1920s and, which is a norm used today in Slovakia for the Hungarian 
minority. In addition, the Law on Basic and Upper Secondary Schools, as amended in 
April 2000, will impose after 2007 a national curriculum on all state secondary 
schools which will consist of a minimum 60:40 ratio in favour of the Estonian 
language, irrespective of the language capabilities of teachers and students.  
 
In Latvia, the resistance levels of the titular nationalists of the Latvian political class 
proved to be too strong for the HCNM. The continuity principle allowed a citizenship 
law of 1995 to entrench a de facto ethnic definition of citizenship. The law allowed a 
small annual quota for ‘naturalization’ by the granting of citizenship to Russophones, 
but it was designed to exclude the near-totality for many decades. Despite a major 
effort, the HCNM secured only minor modifications of the naturalization procedures. 
Liberalizing amendments to the ‘Citizenship law’, such as the abolition of the 
‘naturalization windows’ or staggered ‘timetable’ (i.e the quasi-quota system), and the 
  10extension of citizenship to new-born infants of non-citizens on request of the parents, 
were adopted by the Parliament in June 1998, and approved by a narrow margin in a 
referendum in October 1998. The Latvian political class resisted further concessions 
despite immense pressure from the OSCE Mission and the EU in the run up to the 
Mission closure in December 2001. The take up of citizenship by Russophones, 
however, has been very slow. Between 1995 and January 2005, just 85,352 persons 
were granted Latvian citizenship. In 2002, only 9,844 persons were naturalized, in 
2003 the number was 10,049, and in 2004 16,064 persons (Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs of Latvia, 2005). There may well be instrumental factors involved in this 
trend, such as avoidance of Latvian military conscription, preference for less 
complicated visa arrangements to Russia (though this ended in 2004), and the fee cost 
(currently about 35 US dollars), but the main reason in my view is the alienation of 
the Russophones from the Latvian state after a decade of discrimination. At the 
current rate it will take over a generation for the bulk of the Russophone community 
to acquire citizenship.  
 
Similarly the Law on the State Language in Latvia, adopted in December 1999, 
introduced a ‘public interest’ (Section 2 Art. 2) to regulate the use of language in the 
private and public spheres. The provisions have a deeply intrusive and corroding 
effect on the cultural, economic and political rights of Russophones. For example, the 
language law requires that even private meetings being held by non-Latvian speakers 
must provide for the use of the state language (Latvian) if there is a ‘legitimate public 
interest’. In the absence of large-scale language training in Latvian, these policies 
effectively contribute to the marginalization of minorities by curbing their work 
opportunities and limiting access to decision-making processes (Poleshchuk, 2002).  
 
A detailed study of the OSCE mission in Estonia published in 1999 concluded that 
inter-ethnic relations were such that the country was ‘crisis-prone’ and that the 
mission was a ‘long-term matter’ (Birckenbach, 2000: 58-9). It was astounding then 
that the OSCE Permanent Council decided to close the Estonian and Latvian Missions 
in December 2001. The titular nationalist elites in both states saw the ‘long term’ 
Missions as degrading to their democratic respectability on the international scene. 
For much of the 1990s their approach was to proactively resist OSCE pressure 
(Latvia) or begrudgingly compromise with it (Estonia). How, then, can we account for 
the closure of the missions? International politics played the determining role. The US 
Congress and presidential administrations were subject to sustained pressure from 
ethnic Baltic lobby groups after 1991. Neo-conservative Republicans in particular, 
supported titular nationalism in Latvia and Estonia as a bulwark against the Russian 
‘threat’ and pushed for their speedy entry to NATO. Security, political and economic 
concerns were also prominent in the Nordic states, especially Sweden, that aligned 
themselves with the US to couple and fast track the entry of the Baltic states into the 
EU and NATO. 
 
Guidelines for the mission closures had been set by the Austrian Chairmanship of the 
OSCE in 2000. When the Swedish presidency of the EU finally set a date for 
enlargement (1 May 2004) at the Göteborg summit in June 2001, there was a 
scramble by the EU to terminate OSCE activity in Estonia and Latvia by the end of 
the year. While further concessions on the part of Estonia and Latvia to meet the 
Guidelines were considered desirable, they were no longer considered pre-requisites 
for closure. In the case of Estonia, a compromise on the language requirement for 
  11elected offices delivered in late 2001, allowed that mission to declare that the 
guidelines had been met. In Latvia, in contrast, no such concessions were made. It 
was politically essential, however, for the EU and NATO that both missions be closed 
simultaneously. Consequently, the decisions by the OSCE Permanent Council 
meetings of December 2001 to close both missions, but especially the Latvian, was 
characterized by one observer as akin to ‘banging a square peg into a round hole’.
12 
Not only, did Russia oppose it, but so did Canada. The decision, and the mode of its 
delivery, consolidated Russia’s profound lack of faith in the work of the OSCE and its 
‘double standards’ (OSCE Magazine, 2004).  
 
While the EU and OSCE were in a dash to close the missions, the COE Advisory 
Committee for monitoring minority rights approved an opinion that criticized Estonia 
for its failure to address many fundamental issues relating to minority protection 
(Council of Europe, 2001). The discrimination against the Russophones of  Estonia 
and Latvia has been a low priority for the current OSCE HCNM Rolf Ekeus, a factor 
which has allowed EU and US policymakers to downplay the problem.
13 In contrast, 
the COE’s Commissioner for Human Rights, Alvaro Gil-Robles, has assumed much 
the same proactive and critical role that was performed by the van der Stoel leadership 
of the HCNM in the 1990s. The EU institutions (Council, Commission, Parliament), 
in contrast, are in a conscious denial about the subject because to revisit it in any form 
would be tantamount to admitting that they had got it wrong when assessing Estonia 




The Trends and Incentives for Migration 
 
One would reasonably assume that the rapid growth of the economies of Estonia and 
Latvia (5.8% and 8.5% respectively in 2004), and the prospect of continued growth as 
new EU member states, with falling unemployment and rising living standards, would 
be an incentive for the Russophones to remain in situ. The assumption that economic 
growth in Estonia and Latvia will constrain migration must also assume that the 
discriminatory regime does not extend into employment and business, whether public 
or private sector, and that Russophones are not disadvantaged in sharing the benefits 
of economic growth. 
 
The lack of reliable data on the distribution of economic power by ethnicity makes 
definitive conclusions difficult. What data there is on such issues (and the Estonian 
and Latvian governments discourage the collection of such data), indicates that, in 
fact, the discriminatory regime has penetrated extensively into the public and private 
sectors in both states. Studies of Estonia’s transition have demonstrated that the 
Russophones were subject to systematic discrimination in the marketization of the 
economy which privileged ethnic Estonian citizens (Andersen, 1999). Rates of 
unemployment, poverty levels and social exclusion are significantly higher among the 
Russophones (UNDP Human Development Report on Estonia 1997). A World Bank 
study revealed earnings’ discrimination against Russophones in the Latvian labour 
market, and biases in their treatment if unemployed and non-citizens (Chase, 2000). 
There is a structural explanation for the fact that the Russophones are more likely to 
be unemployed and socially marginalized during the transition. Their employment 
was concentrated in the big Soviet enterprises, and the hub of their social capital and 
  12networks was the enterprise based labour collective. As these enterprises were largely 
eliminated by the economic restructuring after 1991, it is not surprising that the 
Russophones have fared badly from the adjustment to the market. The data suggests, 
however, that the regimes of discrimination are also structural impediments for 
Russophones to maximise their socio-economic opportunities and realise 
expectations. 
 
In the case of Latvia, which is widely acknowledged to have the most punitive 
discriminatory regime, the first trend to note is that actual out-migration from Latvia 
has fallen steadily during from the late 1990s through to the present (see Table 5). 
Emigration peaked in the period 1991-1995 and was correlated with the most intense 
period of nationalising policies and a drive to expel politically undesirable 
‘occupants’ who had served in the Soviet military and security services. In 2003-04, 
the emigration flow amounted to just 2744 persons in total. Of this amount, the 
Russian Federation took the greatest share, comprising 38.5% (Central Statistical 
Bureau of Latvia, 2005). From this trend we can deduce that the vast majority of those 
Russophones who wanted to migrate to the Russian Federation and other parts of the 
former Soviet Union, did so in the 1990s, and that migration in this direction is now 
residual. We should not infer from this, however, that the Russophones are satisfied 
with their conditions in Estonia and Latvia and are in the process of ‘cumulative 
assimilation’. While the Russian economy has also posted significant growth since 
2000 of some 7% per annum, its attraction for migrants is weak because most of its 
growth is accounted for by the energy industries and Russia has a persistent poverty 
problem among about one-third of its population. 
 
When the EU’s Schengen border regime is established after the transitional period in 
Estonia and Latvia, their border with Russia will be hardened even further. Travel and 
migration will be re-channelled towards the other EU states. If an important factor 
impelling migration is the architecture (legal, political, social, and economic) that 
constrains a person’s ability to participate in the polity, to compete in the labour 
market and to develop their culture, then the implications of the present condition of 
Russophones in Estonia and Latvia seem obvious. The key push factor for migration 
is the extensive legal and social discriminatory regimes and the drive for assimilation 
in both states, and the absence of will for integration on the part of both the main 
ethnic communities. The pull factor is the looming access to Russophones of EU-wide 
freedom of movement. The expansion of EU citizenship, and the more inclusive 
approach by the EU to the rights of TCNs, will be incentives for the migration of 
many Russophones to other member states. A major flaw in previous studies of the 
potential for migration from new member states to old has been that surveys have 
focussed on citizens only, thus significantly underestimating the potential among the 
Russophones of Latvia and Estonia (Krieger, 2004).  
 
Will non-citizens be allowed to migrate? The transitional provisions in the accession 
treaties for Estonia and Latvia have imposed qualifications on their status as new 
members. In the area of mobility, the treaties established a period of 5 to 7 years 
during which citizens will have a substantially qualified right to free movement 
compared with the citizens of existing Member States. All things being equal, once 
the transitional period ends, free movement will be allowed. Furthermore, Estonia and 
Latvia are covered by the Council Directive 2003/109/EC of 25 November 2003 on 
the status of TCNs and their rights, including free movement. There is a potential 
  13ambiguity in the Directive in the sense that it equates ‘residents’ with ‘nationals’, and 
seems to assume that all residents have citizenship of a third country. The issue is 
whether the directive would therefore apply to stateless persons such as the 
Russophones of Estonia and Latvia who do not have citizenship. In fact, during the 
negotiations over the Directive the Commission took the view that TCNs are ‘any 
person who is not a citizen of the EU’.
14 Thus, the stateless persons in Estonia and 
Latvia fall within the scope of the Directive. Indeed, when Estonia and Latvia raised 
the issue with the Commission their only concern was that TCNs might enjoy more 
rights to mobility within the EU compared with their own citizens who were subject 
to the transitional restrictions, not that they would have freedom of movement. The 
Commission’s position on this issue was that the Community preference principle 
meant that the TCNs of Estonia and Latvia would not be more favourably treated in 
this respect than their own citizens. Consequently, the whole Russophone minority 
will enjoy the right to free movement within the EU once the transitional provisions 





Hirschman’s model of ‘exit’ has been reinterpreted here to demonstrate how out-
migration in certain conditions of inter-ethnic conflict works differently than his 
model predicts. In such conditions, mass migration would not act as a feedback 
mechanism but as a safety valve to release the build up of social antagonisms against 
discriminatory regimes, and to permanently expunge the ‘problem’ of a minority 
presence. The policies of successive governments in Estonia and Latvia have 
demonstrated that the titular nationalist political class in both states regards the 
presence of the Russophones as an obstacle to their nationalizing projects, their 
preference is for the Russophones to migrate. Sophisticated and extensive regimes of 
discrimination have been established in both states based on restrictions under three 
policy pillars - citizenship, language, and participation. The analysis of the process of 
EU and OSCE international conditionality reveals a lack of political will surrounding 
the whole process. Under international pressure to modify the discrimination, the 
governing elites in Estonia and Latvia resisted major reform or compromises on their 
nationalizing projects, while still achieving their major foreign policy goals of EU and 
NATO entry. Comparative experience suggests that in the absence of significant 
modification or the large-scale migration of Russophones, the regimes of 
discrimination will generate high levels of alienation and potential for inter-ethnic 
conflict within Estonia and Latvia.  
  14Table 1  Population of Estonia by Ethnicity and Citizenship, 2000 
 








Citizenship  Unknown 
Total  1095743  86 067 8941 170 349 8952 
Estonians 922  204  692 165 4896 2262 
Russians  141 907  73 379 1048 133 346 1498 
other  29 774  11 581 7560 31 554 267 
unknown 1858  415 168 553 4925 
Per cent     
Estonians 84.2  0.8 1.8 2.9 25.3 
Russians 12.9  85.3 11.7 78.3 16.7 
other 2.7  13.4 84.6 18.5 3.0 
unknown 0.2  0.5 1.9 0.3 55.0 
 




Table 2a Population of Latvia by Ethnicity and Citizenship, 1995 and 1997 
 
Ethnicity  Citizens of 
Latvia 





% of All Non-




  1995 1997 1995 1997 1995 1997 1995 1997 1995 1997  1995 1997 1995 1997
Latvians  1397523  1382346 78.7% 78.2% 24464 11265 3.3%   1.6% 1421987 1393611 56.5% 56.7% 98.3% 99.2%
Russians  289106 288999 16.3% 16.3% 476790 452981  64.4% 65.9% 765896 741980 30.4% 30.2% 37.7% 38.9%
Belarussians  20971 20993 1.2% 1.2% 88151 83220  11.9% 12.1% 109122 104213 4.3% 4.2% 19.2% 20.1%
Ukrainians  4151 4739 0.2% 0.3% 65183 63434 8.8% 9.2% 69334 68173 2.8% 2.8% 6.0% 7.0%
Poles  39522 38975 2.2% 2.2% 25465 23207 3.4% 3.4% 64987 62182 2.6% 2.5% 60.8% 62.7%
Others  25013 32726 1.4% 1.8% 60178 53379 8.2% 7.8% 85191 86105 3.4% 3.6% 21.3% 28.4%
Total  1776286  1768778  740231 687486 2516517 2456264 70.6%  72.0%
 
Source: UNDP, Latvia Human Development Report, 1997: 49. 
 
Table 2b Residents of Latvia by Nationality on July 1, 2005 
    Citizens of Latvia  Non-citizens  Aliens  In total     
Latvians   1 349 539   2 120   1 033   1 352 692  58.9%  
Lithuanians   17 655   12 263   1 571   31 489   1.4%  
Estonians   1 522   658   349   2 529   0.1%  
Belorussians  28 551   56 829   2 024   87 404   3.8%  
Russians   346 746   288 207   21 084  656 037   28.6%  
Ukrainians   13 812   40 952   3 813   58 577   2.6%  
Poles   40 642   14 885   556   56 083   2.4%  
Jews   6 418   2 796   360   9 574   0.4%  
Others   21 919   14 159   5 599   41 677   1.8%  
In total  1 826 804  432 869  36 389  2 296 062  100,00% 
Source: Board for Citizenship and Migration Affairs, Latvia 
http://www.np.gov.lv/index.php?en=fakti_en&saite=residents.htm
  15Table 3 Immigration to the Baltic States from other Soviet Republics, 1946-1989 
(thousands) 
 
    Estonia  Latvia 
Total no. of immigrants  1,158,600  1,517,800 




Source: Nørgaard, 1996: 170 
 
 
Table 4 Ethnic Compositions of the Populations of Estonia and Latvia (per cent) 
  Latvia   
Ethnicity  1934 1989 1994 
Latvian  77.0 52.0 54.2 
Eastern  Slav  12.1 42.0 39.5 
Poles  2.3 2.5 2.3 
Others  0.6 3.5 4.0 
Total inhabitants 
(million) 













  Estonia   
Ethnicity  1934 1989 1994 
Estonian  88.2 61.5 66.0 
Eastern Slav  8.2  35.2  32.8 
Poles  0.2 0.2 0.2 















Source: Nørgaard, 1996: 172-3. 
 
 
  16Table 5  Long-Term Migration in Latvia by Period (total persons) 
 
Immigration Emigration  Net migration
Period 
TOTAL TOTAL  TOTAL
1951 - 1960  639880 459832 180048
1961 - 1970  476934 335872 141062
1971 - 1980  548643 428235 120408
1981 - 1990  506576 423953 82623
1991 - 1995  30842 168230 -137388
1996 - 2000  12223 47064 -34841
2001 - 2003  4235 12074 -7839
 
Source: Central Statistical Bureau of Latvia, 2005 
http://data.csb.lv/EN/Database/annualstatistics/annualstatistics.asp
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Differences between rights of Latvian citizens and non-citizens/Latvian residents  
 
I. Prohibition to occupy certain state and public positions, to be employed in certain professions
a) State Institutions 
Jobs reserved for Latvian citizens only: 
1. State office  
(Senior Public Service)  
Satversme (The Constitution of the Republic 
of Latvia), as amended of 15.10.98, Art. 101 
2. Civil Servants  The State Civil Service Law, adopted on 
07.09.00, Art.7 
3. Constitutional Court Judges  Constitutional Court Law, adopted on 
05.06.96, Art. 4(2) 
4. Judges  The Law "On Judicial Power", adopted on 
15.12.1992, Art.51(1) 
5. Public Prosecutors  The Law "On the Public Prosecutor's Office", 
adopted on 19.05.94, Art.33 (1) 
6. State Security Officers  The Law "On State Security Institutions", 
adopted on 05.05.94, Art.18  
7. Diplomatic and Consular Service  The Law "On Diplomatic and Consular 
Service", adopted on 21.09.95, Art.3 (2)  
8. Sworn surveyors   The State Land Service Order "On the 
procedure for issuing licenses to sworn 
surveyor practices", adopted on 21.07.93, p.7  
9. Sworn evaluators   The Land service regulations "On special 
licenses to be obtained to value and fix the 
statute ore price of real estate according to 
categories of fixing the statutory price and 
valuation", adopted on 27.12.95, Art. 15  
10. Police Service   Amendments to the Law "On Police" adopted 
by the Cabinet of Ministers of the LR on 
11.01.94, Rules 19, Art.1.5 
11 Prison Guard  The Prison Administration Law, adopted on 
31.10.02, Art.10(1) 
12. State Firefighting and Rescue Service  The Law on Fire Safety and Firefighting, 
adopted on 24.10.02, Art. 28.2 
13. Border guard   The Law on Border Guard, adopted on 
27.11.1997, Art. 7(1) 
14. State Revenue service  The Law on State Revenue Service, adopted 
on 28.10.1993, Art.17 (as amended of 
25.10.2001)  
15. Officials of the Labour Inspection  State Labour Inspection Law, adopted on 
13.12.2001. Art.5 
16 Access to information declared a state secret   Law "On State Secrets", adopted on 17.10.96, 
Art. 9 (2) 
b) Private Sector 
Jobs reserved for Latvian citizens only: 
17. Sworn Advocates and Advocate's Assistants   The Law "On Advocacy", adopted on 
27.04.93, Art.14(1) and 83 
18. Sworn Notaries and Notary's Assistants   Notary Law , adopted on 01.06.93, Art.9(1), 
147(1) 
19. Court bailiffs   The Court Bailiffs Law, adopted on 24.10.02, 
Art. 12(1) 
20. Heads of the detective agency  The  Law on Detective Activity, adopted on 
05.07.01, Art. 4 
  1821. Aircraft captain  The Law "On Aviation", adopted on 05.10.94, 
Art.35 
22. The managers of a security guard 
  
The Law “Security Guard Activities”, adopted 
on 29.10.1998, Art. 6 
23. Only Latvian citizen has the right to be employed 
in civil positions for army units  
  
“Military Service Law”, adopted on 
30.05.2002, Art.16. 
  
24. Non-citizen with pharmaceutical degree obtained 
outside EU can be licensed to practice only after one-
year probation period  
  
"Pharmacy Law", adopted on 10.04.97, Art. 
38(3), as amended on 16.04.2003 
c) Public sector 
Only citizens have the right: 
25. To be elected as jurors  The Law "On Judicial Power" adopted on 
15.12.1992, Art.56 
26. To serve in the National Guard   The Law "On National Guard", adopted on 
06.04.93, Art. 5(1) 
27. To establish political parties  The Law "Оn Public Organizations and 
Associations", adopted on 15.12.92, Art. 43 
28. Political parties are allowed to operate if at least 
1/2 of the members are citizens 
The Law "Оn Public Organizations and 
Associations", adopted on 15.12.92, Art. 45 
with amendments adopted on 05.04.95 
29. To be elected to the National Radio and Television 
Council  
The Radio and Television Law, adopted on 
24.08.1995, Art.42 
30. To participate in local elections  
  
The City Dome and Rural District Councils 
Election Law, adopted on 13.01.94, Art. 5. 
31. To be elected to Commissions and working groups 
of municipalities 
  
The statute of Riga Municipality with 
amendment, adopted on 22.05.2001 
establishes this restriction only for Auditing 
Commission (para 8). In some other 
municipalities (for example, in Jelgava) the 
restriction is expanded to all commissions. 
  
32. To elect and to be elected to the management of 
the Council of students of the University of Latvia  
Statute (Constitution) of the Students' Self – 
Government of the University of Latvia, 1998, 
Art.8 (in force till 2002) 
33. Contacts with foreign citizens, access to cultural 
monuments and mass media are guaranteed to citizens 
only in some of the Agreements 
5 Agreements, signed from 7.08.92 to 




II. Property Rights 
Only citizens have the right to: 
34. Acquire the land into ownership with building on 
it if the land was not owned by them before 22.07.40  
The Law “On the Land Reform in the Cities of 
LR”, adopted on 20.11.91, Art. 12(1),(2)  
35. A judicial person has the right to acquire the land 
plot into ownership in the LR cities if more than a half 
of its statute capital belongs to LR citizens. Should 
this ratio be changed, the deprivation of the land plot 
is envisaged, see  
The Law “On the Land Reform in the Cities of 
LR”, adopted on 20.11.91, Art. 20  
36. Similar to No.35 limitation for judicial persons 
when buying land plots in rural areas  
The Law "On the Land Privatization in Rural 
Regions", adopted on 09.07.92, Art. 28  
37. Every citizen of Latvia is allotted 15 certificates 
more then a non-citizen. A non-citizen born outside 
Latvia gets another 5 certificates less. One certificate 
is the equivalent of the state property volume, created 
during 1 year of a person's life 
The Law "On Privatization Certificates", 
adopted on 16.03.95, Art. 5 (2), (4) 
38. Non-citizens who arrived in Latvia after the 
retirement age (60 for men, 55 for women) and who 
The Law "On Privatization Certificates", 
adopted on 16.03.95, Art 5 (4) 
  19had less than 5 years of hired employment receive no 
privatization certificates  
39. A Latvian citizen is allotted with certificates if he 
lived in Latvia before 31.12.1992 and at any time was 
registered as a permanent resident.  
Non-citizens of Latvia are allotted with certificates 
after their last arrival in Latvia only and having the 
purpose of permanent residence in Latvia. 
The Law "On Privatization Certificates", 
adopted on 16.03.95, Art 5 (3) 
40. Only citizens and legal entities are guaranteed the 
protection of their investments abroad 
25 Agreements, adopted within the period 
26.08.91-17.06.98 (see List, 2) 
41. Protection of intellectual property abroad is 
guaranteed by some bilateral Agreements to citizens 
only 
2 Agreements with 5 states, adopted within the 
period 21.11.95-07.12.95 (see List, 3) 
III. Private enterprise 
42. Licenses for air transportation abroad are 
guaranteed, by bilateral agreements to the companies 
controlled by Latvian citizens. If such control is lost, 
the license is revoked. 
17 Agreements, signed within the period 
01.07.92-04.03.99 (see List, 4) 
43. Only companies controlled by Latvian citizens can 
make fishing at the territory under USA jurisdiction 
Fishery agreement with USA 08.04.93, art.1 
44. Non-discrimination regarding double taxation is 
guaranteed to citizens only 
6 Agreements, signed within the period 
17.11.93-16.10.98 (see List, 5) 
45. Establishment of joint-stock companies is not 
allowed to non-citizens who have resided less than 
21 years in Latvia, Similar limitations exist for 
chairpersons of joint-stock companies, sworn 
auditors 
The Law “On Joint-Stock Companies”, 
adopted on May 18, 1993, Art.10.1 (1), 
17.4 
  
46. Commercial Handling of Weapons is allowed 
only for Latvian citizens and European Union 
citizens 
The Law “On the handling of weapons”, 
adopted on 06.06.2002, Art. 36 
IV. Social Rights
47. Years of employment outside Latvia are not 
included into the non-citizens' employment record 
when calculating pension rates  
Law “On State Pensions”, adopted on 
02.11.95, transitional regulations, Art. 1 
48. Only citizens have the right to receive different 
kinds of social aid on the territory of Finland. Years of 
employment on the territory of Finland are included 
into the citizens’ employment record when calculating 
social insurance only. 
Agreement with Finland on social benefits of 
11.05.1999, Art. 4.1., 5.2., 16, etc. 
V. Other Rights and Freedoms 
49. Only citizens have the right to study in certain 
higher education establishments 
Statute (Constitution) of the Academy of 
Police, adopted by the Cabinet of Ministers on 
17.06.1998, Art. 69  
Statute (Constitution) of the National 
Academy of Defense, adopted by the Cabinet 
of Ministers on 30.06.1998, Art. 22 
50. Latvian citizens may enter 53 foreign countries 
without visas. Non-citizens may enter, without visas, 
only 6 of them 
The latest agreement with South Korea 
entered into force on 27.06.03, see: 
http://www.am.gov.lv/en/?id=574
51. The right on repatriation is enjoyed only by 
Latvian citizens as well as by persons whose ancestors 
are Latvians or Livs. 
Repatriation Law, adopted on 21.10.95, Art. 2 
52. Exemption from the customs duty during transit is 
provided, in some cases, to citizens only 
2 Agreements, signed on 29.11.91 and 
07.12.91 (see List, 6) 
53. Only Latvian citizens and (in some cases) legal 
entities are guaranteed of legal assistance 
9 Agreements, signed between 11.11.92 and 
21.05.98 (see List, 7) 
54. A citizen can be deprived of citizenship by court 
decision only. A non-citizen can be deprived of his 
status by decision of administrative authorities.  
The Law "Оn the Status of the Former USSR 
Citizens Who Are Not Citizens of Latvia or 
Any Other State", adopted on 12.04.95, Art. 7 
  2055. Non-citizens who have received compensation 
when leaving Latvia (i.e. as compensation for   
apartments left behind) from any state institutions or 
from  abroad, apart from losing their former legal 
status, also lose the right to enter Latvia for residency 
The Law "Оn the Status of the Former USSR 
Citizens Who Are Not Citizens of Latvia or 
Any Other State", adopted on 12.04.95, Art.1 
(3) – according to the new Immigration Law, 
they may enter, if they pay back the 
compensation 
56. The right to reunify with an adult child having no 
Latvian citizenship is reserved for Latvian citizens  
only 
The Law «On Immigration», adopted on 
31.10.2002. Art. 24(1), 31(1) 
  
57. Non-citizens can be acknowledged as politically 
repressed persons (by the Nazi regime), if they were 
repressed because of their national identity or were 
minors and were confined in prisons and 
concentration camps in the territory of Latvia at that 
time.  
The Law "On Determining the Status of 
Politically Repressed Persons who are Victims 
of Communist and Nazi Regimes", adopted on 
12.04.95, Art.4, pp. 1-3  
 
 
58. The right to self-defense: to acquire and receive a 
weapon as a personal award is allowed only to citizens 
The Law "On the handling of weapons", 
adopted on 06.06.2002, Art. 19(6) 
59. Only Latvian citizens are entitled to form 
collections of weapons  
The Law "On the handling of weapons", 
adopted on 06.06.2002, Art. 34 
  
 Source: website of the Latvian Greens European Free Alliance Party (RSTVL) 
http://www.pctvl.lv/?lang=en
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  24Notes 
                                                 
1 The term ‘nationalizing’ as coined by Brubaker means ‘a state of and for a particular ethnocultural 
“core nation” whose language, culture, demographic position, economic welfare, and political 
hegemony must be protected and promoted by the state’ (Brubaker, 1996, 105). The term Russophones 
is often erroneously used interchangeably with the term ‘ethnic Russians’. Here it denotes all those 
citizens and residents (permanent and temporary) in Estonia and Latvia whose primary language is 
Russian.  
 
2 The differences of meaning in the terms ‘integration’ and ‘assimilation’ are not deeply explored in 
these works, see Laitin (1998: 30) and Kolstø (1999:1-14). I employ the terms ‘integration’ and 
‘assimilation’ here as end points on a spectrum defined by power relations, with ‘integration’ more 
characterised by greater parity in the process, and assimilation characterised by a more unilateral 
process.  
 
3 We can assume that extreme policies such as genocide and the mass expulsion of the Russophones 
can be ruled out from our analysis as impractical under current conditions.  
 
4 Hirschman defined ‘voice’ as ‘any attempt at all to change, rather than to escape from, an 
objectionable state of affairs’ (Hirschman, 1970: 30). 
 
5 Recent official country statistical office data indicates just over 800,000 Russophones in Latvia out of 
a population of around 2.3 million, and about 400,000 in Estonia out of a population of around 1.3 
million. By comparison Germany’s largest ethnic minority, Turks, account for just over 1.7 million 
(just over 2%) of its 82 million population. 
 
6 The election laws in Latvia are available at  http://web.cvk.lv/pub/?doc_id=28180
 
7 The main minority communities prior to 1939 were Russians, Poles, Germans, and Jews. By the end 
of World War Two the bulk of the Germans had been forced to out-migrate, and the bulk of the Jews 
had been exterminated (for data on population changes 1897-1996 see Lauristin and Vihalemm eds, 
1997: 305).  
 
8 Specifically, the Hague Recommendations on the Education Rights of National Minorities (1996), the 
Oslo Recommendations on the Linguistic Rights of National Minorities  (1998), and the Lund 
Recommendations on the Effective Participation of National Minorities in Public Life (1999): 
http://www.osce.org/hcnm/documents/recommendations/index.php3
 
9 The first Copenhagen criterion stated that: ‘Membership requires that the candidate country has 
achieved stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, human rights, the rule of law and respect for 
and protection of minorities’. 
 
10 See for his example his own collection of speeches (Van der Stoel, 2001: especially at 171-8). 
 
11 Some of the documents are available on the OSCE and OSCE HCNM website at 
http://www.osce.org/hcnm/documents.html
 
12 Unattributable information about the mission closures provided to author in May 2005. 
 
13 Ekeus replaced van der Stoel in July 2001. 
 
14 Unattributable briefing from a Commission official to author in April 2005. 
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